While the existing literature on vertical contractual relations has established that resale price maintenance is su¢ cient to coordinate the retail network of a manufacturer, this paper asks whether such vertical restraints are necessary. We study the vertical contracting problem between an upstream manufacturer and his downstream retail distribution channel in a setting where appealing to resale price maintenance is not possible due to legal prohibition, and examine whether other forms of contracting can achieve the outcome of vertical integration. We show that a bonus scheme based on retail revenues is su¢ cient to provide incentives to decentralized retailers to elicit the correct level of both price and service. Interestingly, an incentive scheme based on retail sales is unable to do so. Intuitively, an incentive scheme based on quantity alone will fail because it does not alter the source of incentive incompatibility between manufacturer and retailer, namely retail price competition. On the other hand, an incentive scheme based on retail revenue is able to coordinate the distribution channel because higher bonus levels are attainable not only by increasing sales, but also by increasing price; higher service levels then follow, as there is a su¢ cient retail margin to underwrite them.
INTRODUCTION
any negative impact on sales resulting from a higher resale price. Moreover, despite higher prices, consumers as a group can bene…t on net, as the market provides more of the service they desire.
The extant literature on resale price maintenance has made great headway towards an economic theory of vertical contractual relations. First, it has formally described the incentive incompatibility between upstream and downstream …rms which gives rise to the use of vertical restraints, such a resale price maintenance. Second, it has raised signi…cant questions about the asymmetry in the laws towards price restraints and non-price restraints, providing a justi…cation for price maintenance to be judged according to a rule of reason rather then the current rule of per-se illegality. However, while showing the su¢ ciency of resale price maintenance, what has been left unanswered by the literature is whether such a contract is necessary to coordinate the downstream network of an upstream …rm. Addressing this issue is important to practitioners in the …eld of vertical contracting: if many vertical restraints are deemed to be quasi-illegal or even illegal, and therefore open to legal challenge, they may be dominated by other contractual instruments that are minimally su¢ cient and not open to legal challenge. The question remains: is the space of minimally su¢ cient contracts to achieve joint manufacturer/retailer pro…t maximization made up only of those contacts that rely on some form of vertical restraints?
Towards providing an answer to this question, I provide a stylized model where RPM is known to be su¢ cient, a la Winter (1993) , and consider alternative solutions to the contracting problem. The paper is biased towards a model which makes explicit assumptions about the environment, in order to provide detailed, yet insightful, analytic expressions for the contracting problem under study. Yet the use of a stylized model by no means limits the applicability of the results; in fact, the main …ndings of the paper, Propositions 4 and 5, are demonstrated without appealing to the speci…c functional form assumptions of the model.
The model I examine in the paper is based on four features of retail networks which gives rise to the need for sophisticated contracts beyond a simple spot price. First, retailers are spatially di¤erentiated in terms of location, and it is costly for consumers to travel and shop. Second, retailers provide point-of-sale service, whose levels are not contractible, and this service is valued by consumers. Third, consumers are heterogeneous in the distance they have to travel to retail outlets, as well as in their valuation of retail service; moreover there is a correlation between a consumers travel cost and value for service. Finally, retailers compete with each other, in both price and service, for sales.
To maximize total channel pro…ts, the manufacturer would like retailers to provide a high level of service, thereby attracting inconveniently located consumers with high willingness to pay for service 1 INTRODUCTION into the market. As these consumers are less price elastic, the manufacturer can extract higher surplus in return. Retailers on the other hand, not only concern themselves with the product margin, but when competing with each other for consumers, take into consideration the inter-retailer margin as well. However, consumers on the inter-retailer margin place lower value on service, and are instead attracted to one retailer over another by lower prices. Competition between retailers drives the resale price of the product down; focusing on the inter-retailer margin drives down the retailers' level of service.
In this model, a simple wholesale pricing contract fails to coordinate the distribution channel However, Winter (1993) shows, that, with the introduction of a second instrument, namely that of a vertical restraint, the upstream …rm is able to align the incentives of his downstream network with those of his own. Speci…cally, a resale price ‡oor can serve to guarantee retailers a high enough pricecost margin to elicit the correct level of service. In this paper, I reexamine the contracting problem of the manufacturer to determine whether alternatives to vertical restraints are also elements of the space of minimally su¢ cient solutions 2 . For, even if resale price maintenance is a solution to the contracting problem, the associated anti-trust implications could make it unappealing.
The …rst novel result of this paper, Proposition 4; completely characterizes a contract that appeals to a …nancial incentives scheme to coordinate the retail distribution channel of the monopolist manufacturer. In particular, I show that a linear bonus scheme written on retail sales revenues, together with an ordinary franchise contract, is able to align the interests of distributor and manufacturer; the promise of su¢ cient …nancial carrots can provide enough incentive to the retail network to self select the …rst-best levels of price and service. The manufacturer's role in such a contract cannot be understated -he serves as the third-party budget breaker which makes such a bonus scheme feasible. Interestingly, a contract involving an incentive scheme written on retail sales volume is unable to coordinate the distribution channel. Thus, not all carrots are created equal.
Intuitively, an incentive scheme based on quantity alone will fail because it does not alter the source of incentive incompatibility, namely retail competition. On the other hand, an incentive scheme based on retail revenue is able to coordinate the distribution channel because higher bonus levels are attainable not only by increasing sales, but also by increasing price; increases in service levels then follow, as there are su¢ cient price cost margins to support them. The analysis of incentive schemes based on quantity …nds an intimate relationship between the such contracts and those based on a
wholesale price alone, namely their failure is caused by the same culprit. In particular, the source of failure is the fact that the ratio of …rm to market price elasticities is larger then the ratio of …rm to market elasticities of service. More importantly, however, the analysis of an incentive scheme based on revenues shows us that the ability of such a bonus scheme to elicit the …rst-best outcome stems from exploiting this exact same source.
Having examined contracting options that are based on a retailer's own targets, I then examine sharing schemes. If retailers are capital constrained, the manufacturer must restrict his attention to …nancial incentives schemes which are budget balanced at the downstream level; by de…nition, sharing schemes do this. Proposition 5; characterizes the minimally su¢ cient revenue sharing scheme. With a sharing scheme, by giving each a share of their opponents revenues, retailers internalize the bene…ts from raising their price and service levels -which arise through mitigating the horizontal pecuniary externality. Hence, retailers disengage from price competition, as they put less focusing on the marginal inter-retailer consumer. On the other hand, since a retailer lays claim to less of his own revenues (as some is taken by his opponent), while still faces the whole cost of service provision, he is less inclined to increase his level of service and price. Thus, the manufacturer must carefully design the revenues sharing scheme to balance disincentives with su¢ cient incentives.
For the economics literature, this paper provides us with a more complete understanding of the vertical contracting problem between an upstream …rm and his downstream associates. First, it formally establishes that the space of minimally su¢ cient contracts is not monopolized by contracts which rely on vertical restraints. Thus, while resale price maintenance may be su¢ cient to coordinate a distribution channel, it is by no means necessary. Secondly, it helps us better understand the reasons why sophisticated contracts are needed to coordinate the manufacturer's distribution channel. At …rst glance, it may appear that the driving force behind the call to vertical restraints is a need to limit horizontal competition amongst downstream retailers. The contract I suggest here shows that this is not the case: the failure of spot contracts is solely driven by a misalignment of incentives between upstream and downstream …rms. Appealing to vertical restraints is only one way to solve this incentive incompatibility; an equivalent method would be to implement a bonus incentive scheme or a revenue sharing scheme. Lastly, it makes clear that the space of solutions to the vertical contracting problem is quite complex: denying incentive schemes based on quantity, but allowing schemes based on price (resale price maintenance), and on revenue (the product of price and quantity).
The structure of this paper is as follows: section 2 reviews the related literature on resale price maintenance and the service argument. Section 3 presents the basic model of a monopolist manufacturer who retails his product through a network of independent retailers, and then reviews some of the known results on resale price maintenance. Section 4 forms the heart of the paper; there, I probe for the existence of alternative contracts, that do not rely on vertical restraints, in the set of contracts that are minimally su¢ cient to coordinate the distribution channel: Section 4.1 covers incentive schemes based on own variables, Section 4.2 covers sharing schemes. Finally, in section 5, I consider the case of retail price ceilings. Section 6 concludes the paper.
RPM: The Economics Literature
Simple linear wholesale price contracts often fail to coordinate a manufacturers distribution channel:
vertical externalities (between retailer and manufacturer) and horizontal externalities (between retailers) signi…cantly complicate the contracting problem. The economics literature has focused on several contractual provisions, referred to as Vertical Restraints, as solutions to the vertical contracting problem. These include: two part tari¤s, general non-linear pricing, quantity …xing, ties, exclusive dealing, exclusive territories and, most importantly, resale price maintenance 3 . Resale price maintenance, in particular, has received a signi…cant amount of attention, primarily because, historically under both Canadian and U.S. anti-trust law, it has been a criminal (in fact a per-se) o¤ense.
Two arguments are often cited to support the anti-trust viewpoint on resale price ‡oors. First, RPM may facilitate the operation of manufacturer cartels (e.g. Tesler (1960) , Jullien and Rey (2007) ),
where each manufacturer provides his product at a common supra competitive wholesale price. The claim is that a manufacturer cartel can more easily monitor retail prices that are public to determine whether cartel members are adhering to the cartel wholesale price. Second, RPM may facilitate the operation of retailer cartels (e.g., Posner (1976), Rey and Verge (2004) ). The claim is that retailer cartels may …nd it easier to remain cohesive by using an institution (the manufacturer) to "certify" their product and then have this institution imposes RPM. While the manufacturer cartel explanation has some intuitive appeal to explain resale price ‡oors, the critical question for the retailer cartel claim is why a manufacturer would have any interest in facilitating a collusive retail sector.
The traditional economic argument in support of resale price maintenance is the services argument.
of Tesler (1960) . Suppose the manufacturer retails his product through multiple retailers. In addition, suppose that the demand for the product depends on costly pre-sales service provided by retailers. The provision of service at the downstream may create a horizontal externality amongst retailers, which can lead to a price-cost margin that is too small for retailers to underwrite a large level of service provisions. By imposing a resale price ‡oor, Tesler argues that the manufacturer can provide a large enough retailer margin to give an incentive for all retailers to self-select the correct level of service.
Tesler (1960) relied solely on verbal arguments in his defense of a resale price ‡oor. Mathewson and Winter (1983) were the …rst to show the ability of resale price maintenance to solve the problem of dealer moral hazard through a formal, though somewhat stylized, economic model. In their model, there is a unit mass of consumers of two types of consumers, high search cost and low search cost, each with downward slopping demand function for the product under consideration. However, consumers have to be "informed" to buy product, this product information coming only at the downstream level.
The manufacturer of the product provides his product for resale through two types of retailers: a small number of monopolistically competitive retailers who provide costly service, and a large number of perfectly competitive non-informing retailers. Consumers randomly bump into retail outlets: once there, they can buy from the retailer if it is of the "informing" type, or can "search" for a low cost, non-informing retail store.
Two externalities are at play in the Mathewson and Winter model -a vertical externality of the double marginalization kind, and a horizontal externality arising from non-informing retailers free riding of the sales service of informing outlets. As a result, too few informing outlets exist in a decentralized free-entry equilibrium, and resale price maintenance is needed to achieve the …rst-best outcome. By setting a price ‡oor at the …rst-best price, the manufacturer can sustain a large enough retail margin for non-informing stores to become informing stores. A linear wholesale price then serves the role of a franchise fee to transfer pro…ts back to the manufacturer. is a service externality arising from the assumption that the service a consumer associates with each retailer's product is a weighted average of the service provided by all retailers. In an extension of the service argument beyond simple pre-sale service, Marvel and McCa¤erty (1984) consider a model of free-riding on quality certi…cation. In Marvel and McCa¤erty (1984) , a retail outlet's brand image is subject to the same sort of free-riding as is retail service provision: consumers can purchase the same goods they see on the shelves of stores with a high brand image from stores with a lower brand image at a discounted price. In these models, free-riding and the inability of a retailer to appropriate all bene…ts from own his service provisions to consumers leads to the failure of simple wholesale pricing contracts, and the subsequent call to vertical restraints.
The literature reviewed so far presents free-riding on dealer provided service as the basic justi…cation for implementing RPM. This has led some authors (e.g. Scherer and Ross (1990) ) to question the empirical importance of Tesler's argument. However, as Mathewson and Winter (1998) argue, the service argument is much more general then it appears. In fact, as shown in Winter (1993) , all that is needed to bring about the failure of simple spot-market contracts, and thus the call to price-restraints, is for the ratio of …rm to market price elasticities be larger then the ratio of …rm to market service elasticities. While this condition is satis…ed by the free-riding explanation, it is also met by many other models of resale price maintenance. In this scenario, price competition to get the marginal consumer between retailers drives down prices. As a result, service is too low since price-cost di¤erentials are too small to sustain higher level of services. However, Winter shows that RPM is su¢ cient to coordinate the channel: a resale price ‡oor of at the …rst-best price elicits the correct resale price and frees wholesale price to be used as an instrument to elicit the correct level of service; a franchise fee can then be used to transfer pro…ts back to the manufacturer. 
A Model of Retail Channel Coordination
The formal analysis begins by setting up a basic model of retail competition in a spatial environment.
I then show that the basic model has su¢ cient structure to set the stage; namely, a simple wholesale pricing contract fails to coordinate a manufacturer's distribution channel, and thus the call for more sophisticated contracts. This section also provides a review of the basic incentive incompatibility between a manufacturer and retailer found in a retail model based on a "correlation of product information costs and price information costs".
Setting up the Basic Model
Consider a linear city with unit length. The market is served by a monopolist manufacturer, who distributes his product through two independent retailers, call them retailers 1 and 2 4 . These retailers are spatially di¤erentiated, locations …xed, with retailer 1 located at address zero and retailer 2 located at the address one. 5 We assume the manufacturer has a constant cost technology for production, and we normalize this constant level of marginal cost to zero. The manufacturer's base contract with his retailers is a franchise contract fF; wg, where w > 0 is a linear wholesale price at which he sells his product out to retailers and F is a …xed franchise fee. Additionally, the manufacturer can appeal to contract provisions from the set ; the set of all contracting provisions under the sun. Retailers purchase their inventory from the manufacturer and then compete in both resale price p and service s. We assume that each retailer o¤ers a single price and service level at his outlet. 6 A retailer's cost of providing service is given by the linear function c(s) = s. 7 A retailer's outside option, in the event of rejecting a contract, is one providing only a competitive level of returns.
There is a unit mass of potential consumers, uniformly distributed across the city. Every consumer has unit demands for the good in question, which each values at the common reservation price R > 0;
utility from non-purchase is set at zero. In addition to this basic value, two other factors a¤ect the utility from consuming the good. First, the consumer must incur some disutility cost traveling to, and then shopping at, a retailer. Second the consumer also receives utility from the point-of-sale service that a retailer adds to the basic product. Thus, this retail service partly o¤sets shopping costs and partly enhances the product's appeal. Consumers, however, vary not only in their physical address in the city, but also in their valuation of the service provided by retailers.
At each location, we assume there are two types of consumers, indexed by a taste parameter
Consumers of type L have low willingness-to-pay for service, while consumers of type H have a high willingness-to-pay for service. As our focus throughout the paper is on symmetric equilibria, we assume that there is an equal number of high and low types in the city. This assumption, though not needed, drastically simpli…es the expressions to follow and helps remove any incentive for price discrimination arising from non-uniformity. The utility received by a consumer with taste parameter when shopping at a retailer o¤ering a service level of s is given by
, where U (s) exhibits diminishing returns. For ease of exposition, and to provide closed form 5 The model can easily be generalized to the case of N retailers, by considering a circular city model with retail locations spaced symmetrically around the city. 6 The type of service we have envisioned in the model is pre-sale service. As we will see, heterogeneity in consumer tastes may result in an incentive to try and price discriminate across consumers by o¤ering a menu of price-service o¤erings. However, any attempt to charge higher prices for bundles consisting of the product together with higher levels of pre-sales service will undoubtedly fail. Consumers will acquire the higher level pre-sale service and then simply walk out of the store, only to return an instant later and purchase the product bundled with lower service level at a lower price.
On the other hand, with post-sale service -for example warranties -such price discrimination strategies are feasible; in e¤ect, post-sales service allows the product to be bundled with service to-be-rendered. 7 The model measures levels of service in dollar units.
expressions whenever needed, I assume U (s) = p s 8 .
A crucial element of the model is what Mathewson and Winter (1998) refer to as a "correlation of product information costs and price information costs". To this end, we postulate an interconnection between a consumer's willingness to pay for service and his travel costs. More speci…cally, we assume that a consumer of type located at address x occurs a disutility cost of jd xj when traveling to, and shopping, from the retailer located at location d 2 f0; 1g 9 . Thus in our model, there is perfect correlation between a consumers preference for service and his travel cost. 10 In summary, the model speci…es that the utility of a consumer of type fx; g when purchasing from the retailer located at address d o¤ering the good for sale at a price p and providing service level s, is given by
It follows that, the demand for the product as served by, say retailer 1; is given by the measure of
the former being a participation condition, and the latter being a market allocation condition. The conditions de…ning the demand for the product from retailer 2 are analogous.
Two additional assumption are needed to close the model:
The …rst-best outcome involves a symmetric con…guration of retail outlets.
Assumption 2 In the …rst-best optimum, low-type consumers are fully served 8 The results here can be generalized and shown to hold any distribution of consumers over -types, and for any increasing and concave function U (s):
9 An earlier version of this paper included a travel cost parameter t in the speci…cation. I set t = 1; but note that the following results can be generalize for any t 2 (0; 1).
1 0 This assumption is common in the literature (for example, Iyer (1998)). The justi…cation of this assumption is based on the observation that, a consumers willingness to pay for service and his travel costs originate from the same source, namely the consumer's income (see, for example the marketing studies by Hill (1985) ). 1 1 The utility speci…cation here di¤ers slightly from that of Winter (1993) . To reconcile the di¤erences, let r be the consumer reservation price, and let 1 T be amount of time it requires a consumer of type to shop at a retailer, had no service been provided. De…ne the function T (s) = 1 T U (s): Then, in a Winter(1993) utility speci…cation, we have u(x; ) = r [T (s) + jd xj] p; or u(x; ) = (r T ) + [U (s) jd xj] p; the latter of which results in the current speci…cation with R = r T:
A symmetric con…guration of retailers is always a local optimum of the …rst-best problem. However, if the variation in consumer tastes is large enough, the vertically integrated manufacturer may be enticed into segmenting and then price discriminating across consumers by choosing an asymmetric con…guration of retailers. Assumption 1 rules this out; and we focus on the case where a symmetric con…guration of stores is optimal for the manufacturer. Now, note that it is not possible to have an symmetric equilibrium where both segments are covered. 12 Assumption 2 states that the segment of consumers that is fully served under vertical integration is the low-type segment. This latter implication is crucial to the model: as shown later, it is competition over low type consumers that creates the need for a price ‡oor 13 . A necessary condition for Assumptions 1 and 2 to be met is for 0 < L < H < 1;
I provide su¢ cient conditions in the appendix.
Figure 1: Timing of Events
The timing of events in the model is as follows. At the beginning of the game there is a contracting stage, where the manufacturer chooses the contracts to o¤er to his retailers. This is followed by a retailer competition game, in which the retailers simultaneously choose the level of their service provisions and their resale prices. Finally, at the end of the game, consumers observe the price-service o¤erings of the retailers, and decide whether to buy the product, and if so, which retailer to visit.
RPM: Existing Results
The simpli…ed set-up of the model provides closed-form expressions for the demand of product at the two spatially di¤erentiated retail outlets; what follows speci…es the demand function at retail outlet 1 -that at retail outlet 2 is analogous. Given the implications of Assumption 2, the participation constraint for the high types is binding; hence there is a high type consumer, labeled x H ; who is just indi¤erent between purchasing and not, his location given by
For low types, the participation constraint is non-binding, as the market is fully covered. Hence, there exists a consumer in the interior of the city, labeled x L , who is the subject of competition between the two retailers. The location of this consumer is given by
Thus, the demand at retail outlet 1
The diagram below depicts the demand con…guration for each retailer under vertical integration.
In this …gure, consumers with high willingness-to-pay for service and an inconvenient location do not buy; otherwise, consumers buy from the nearest retailers. Consumers who are just indi¤erent between buying the product or not are said to be on the product margin (where (1) is satis…ed with equality).
Consumers who buy the product, but who are just indi¤erent between the two retailers are said to be on the inter-retailer margin (where (2) is satis…ed with equality) and are characterized by inconvenient locations and low willingness to pay for service. Our …rst task is to establish the levels of price and service that the manufacturer seeks to implement in a decentralized equilibrium, i.e. those that he would have set himself had he vertically integrated with his retailers.
Proposition 1 Under vertical integration the price and service levels the manufacturer would set in a symmetric equilibrium are, respectively
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, these solutions indicate that, to maximize total channel pro…ts, the manufacturer focuses on the product margin and wants his retailers to provide a high level of service, thereby attracting consumers with high willingness-to-pay for service into the market. As these consumers are also less sensitive to price, the manufacturer can consequently charge a higher resale price for his product in return.
When the retail network of the manufacturer is decentralized, however, retailers concern themselves not only with the product margin, but the inter-retailer margin as well. Consumers on the interretailer margin are low-type, and have less use for service; rather, they are attracted to one retailer over another by lower prices. Consequently, decentralization results in two externalities: a classic vertical externality arising from the double markup of retailer on top of the by the manufacturer, and a horizontal pecuniary-externality arising from the two retailers competing with each other for consumers. Thus, a decentralized retail network leads to an incentive incompatibility between retailers and the manufacturer.
Proposition 2 Given a wholesale price w 0; in any symmetric decentralized retail equilibrium where low type consumers are fully served, the common price and service levels set by each retailer are given
The incentive incompatibility between retailer and manufacturer is made clear by comparing the price and service levels under decentralization with those under vertical integration. Recall that the …rst-best price-service o¤erings are based on the tastes of the high-type consumers alone. However, when competing with each other for sales, retailers take into consideration low-type consumers as well.
Note too that the di¤erence in these expressions stems not only from the introduction of a wholesale price; even when w = 0; so that the vertical externality is absent, retailers do not set their prices or service provisions to …rst-best levels.
A simple linear wholesale-pricing contract fails to align the incentives of the retailers with the manufacturer. Intuitively, there are two targets for the manufacturer -the prices and services levels of the retailers -and a single instrument -a linear wholesale price -is insu¢ cient to coordinate the distribution channel. More formally, the source of this incentive incompatibility can be shown by comparing the pro…t maximization problem of the manufacturer under vertical integration with that of retailers under decentralization. Total channel pro…ts, i.e. those under vertical integration, are given
and the …rst-best symmetric contract involves sets (p ; s ) to solve
On the other hand, the pro…ts of retailer i, given the choices of his competitor, retailer j, are given by
or using , this can be rewritten as
In a decentralized equilibrium, given the choice (p j ; s j ) of retailer j ; retailer i chooses (p i ; s i ) to solve 
Proposition 3
In a decentralized retail network: (i) a wholesale price-franchise fee contract fails to coordinate the distribution channel. However, (ii)a contract involving a resale price ‡oor, together with a wholesale price and franchise fee is su¢ cient to achieve the coordinated outcome.
Proof. Part (i ): Consider the franchise contract fF; wg. By charging a …xed franchise fee equal to F = i , the manufacturer can transfer all retailer pro…ts upstream without a¤ecting the incentives at the downstream level. What remains to establish is whether a linear wholesale price provides the correct incentives to dealers to undertake the …rst-best levels of price and service.
From the retailer's problem in a decentralized supply chain, by imposing symmetry on the associated …rst order conditions, we can derive the following Symmetric Best Response Function
A franchise contract is su¢ cient if there exists a wholesale price b w such that (p ; s ) is a …xed point of b( ; b w).
Conditional on s , the wholesale price which elicits the …rst-best resale price (i.e. yields p as a …xed point of b p (; s ; b w) ) is given by
while that needed to elicit the …rst-best level of service, conditional on p (i.
But as H > L , these two expressions do not coincide. In fact w p > w s .
Part (ii ): By comparing the …rst-order conditions from retailers i 0 s problem in a decentralized equilibrium with those of a vertically integrated manufacturer, we can write the incompatibility between the manufacturer's and retailer's incentives when the retailer chooses price and service levels as,
Incompatability in s :
By de…nition, a su¢ cient contract sets both of these expressions to zero at (p 1 ; s 1 ) = (p 2 ; s 2 ) = (p ; s ).
Suppose the manufacturer set his wholesale price to correct for the externalities in the retailer's choice of service -choosing w s so as to set the second of these equations to zero. Substituting in the appropriate derivative terms into equation (21) yields
and we see that the wholesale price that elicits the correct service level is w RP M = 1 3 p : However, at a wholesale price of 1 3 p ; the sign of the combined externalities in the retailers choice of price, equation (20) , is negative when (p 1 ; s 1 ) = (p 2 ; s 2 ) = (p ; s ), since we have
This implies that a further restraint, namely a price ‡oor at p = p , is needed to ensure that the retailer sets the correct price.
Intuitively, a dealer provides the correct level of service if faced with a large enough retail margin (see (17) ). A binding price ‡oor is used to provide this margin because, left unrestrained, retail competition over the marginal low-type consumer drives prices too low to support the e¢ cient level of service.
What is critical is that the mechanism left to the manufacturer to enforce the price ‡oor is to refuse to supply the product to any retailer setting a price below the proscribed minimum price. It is this refusal to supply that lies at the historical root of the legal challenge to contracts involving minimum price ‡oors 15 .
Alternative Solutions to the Problem
As noted above, a manufacturer facing a service problem in the distribution network has the option to use resale price maintenance. Such a contract, if enforced, aligns the incentives of the retailers and those of the manufacturer. The dilemma faced by a manufacturer is that such a contract may face legal challenge. Resale price ‡oors may be legally unenforceable: a court of law may not rule in favor of the manufacturer if a retailer decides to breach the contract, and his price below the proscribed price ‡oor. Moreover, given the optimal strategy for a retailer is to undercut his opponent's price, should his opponent charge a price of p , a retailer an every incentive to deviate from the manufacturer's contract. Thus, given the potential legal challenges associated with RPM, a pro…t-maximizing manufacturers may be interested in other contracts that make the dealers' incentives compatible with his own. De…ning these other contractual options remain an open question.
I now explore this issue, and in particular, examine whether the set of minimally su¢ cient contracts also includes contracts that do not rely on vertical restraints to coordinate the distribution channel.
What lies at the crux of our analysis so far is that a manufacturer must call on a second instrument, in addition to a wholesale price, to align the incentives of retailers with those of his own. There is no 1 5 For example, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), the Spray-Rite Service Corporation sued the Monsanto Company, after Monsanto declined to renew a herbicide distributorship contract with Spray-Rite on the basis that Spray-Rite did not "exploit fully the potential markets for the Good in the Distributor's area of primary responsibility". Spray Rite alleged that its termination violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, and upheld a Federal District Court's award of $10.5 million in damages to Spray-Rite (a company whose pro…ts from the resale of Monsanto's products at the time of the termination were $16,000). a priori reason to expect that only resale price maintenance can to do so. 16 At issues is that, without su¢ cient incentives, retailers do not provide the "correct" level of point-of-sale service. Intuitively, then, what is needed to overcome the service dilemma is a carefully designed …nancial incentive scheme.
Bonus schemes are incentive devices as opposed to contractual restrictions. With RPM, incentives are enforced through a stick -the manufacturer's threat to suspend supply for deviating dealers. Bonus schemes provide incentives or carrots, in the form of …nancial compensation. While it is obvious that carrots in general provide incentives, what is less obvious is whether there exists incentive mechanisms that provide su¢ cient incentives. Towards an answer to this question, I …rst examine …nancial incentive schemes written on a retailer's own targets; I then consider sharing schemes.
Schemes Based on Own Targets
The analysis begins with determining what type of contacts are feasible to a manufacturer, or more precisely what contractual options exist for manufacturer. Clearly, contracting directly on service levels alleviates the coordination problems. Unfortunately, service levels are typically unobservable and unveri…able, and thus such a contract is unenforceable. Likewise, a manufacturer may consider a contract based on pro…ts. But with service levels unobservable, economic costs are a measurement concern: arti…cial manipulation of costs by a retailer can lead to false pro…t signals. 17 If contracts written on service levels or pro…ts are infeasible, this leaves two variables available to the manufacture to de…ne appropriate incentives: quantities and revenues. The vertical contracting literature appears to have ignored contracts based on these two measures. However, sales quantities are an observable candidate, as retailers must submit their purchase orders to the manufacturer in order to stock and resell the product. Similarly, revenues are a veri…able target: quantities are observable;
and if resale prices were unobservable RPM would not have been an option in the …rst place.
Consider the contract fF; w; I(T )g; where the traditional franchise contract is augmented by I(T ); a bonus scheme based on a target T: This contract involves the same number of instruments as a RPM contract. Thus, if fF; w; I(T )g coordinates the distribution channel, it too belongs in the set of 1 6 Indeed, as Winter (1993) shows, a contract relying on closed territorial distribution, in addition to a wholesale price, is also in the set of minimally su¢ cient contracts. However, territorial restrictions fall in the …eld of vertical restraints, and themselves raise anti-trust issues -although such questions are judged on a rule of reason. 1 7 In fact, even if pro…ts are observable, a bonus scheme based on a retailer's own pro…ts would not be su¢ cient. To see this note that, from Proposition (3) 
The individual rationality constraints, (27) and (28), require that the contract leave retailers a level of pro…ts no less then their outside competitive option. The incentive compatibility constraints, (29) and (30), require that the retailers self-select the …rst-best levels of resale price and service in a Nash-Equilibrium of the retail competition stage that follows the contracting stage. The contract fw; F; I(T )g is alone su¢ cient if the pro…ts from the above program achieve those from vertical integration. The following proposition shows that such a contract exists.
Proposition 4
In a decentralized retail network: (i) a contract consisting of a wholesale, franchise fee, and an incentive scheme written on quantity will fail to coordinate the distribution channel. However,
(ii) A contract composed of a wholesale, franchise fee, and a bonus incentive scheme written on revenues is su¢ cient to achieve the …rst-best equilibrium.
Proof. P art (i):
Consider the contract fF; w; I(q)g; where I(q) is an incentive scheme based on a retailer's sales of q units. Under such a contract, retailer i 0 s problem in the retail competition game, given his competitor's choice (p j ; s j ); is
Use the pro…t function from vertical integration to rewrite this as
The associated …rst order conditions characterizing the equilibrium choice of (p i ; s i ) are
The proof is by contradiction: suppose the quantity bonus scheme is able to implement a symmetric equilibrium at the …rst-best optimum (p ; s ) from vertical integration: At (p ; s ); we have @ =@p i = @ =@s i = 0: Since the proposed contract is assumed to be su¢ cient, the manufacturer can choose w and I(q) to set the last three terms of each …rst-order conditions to zero at (p 1 ; s 1 ) = (p 2 ; s 2 ) = (p ; s ).
Let the manufacturer set the wholesale price to solve (34), the …rst order condition for service: This implies that w must be set to 
The associated …rst-order conditions characterizing his equilibrium choice of (p i ; s i ) are
Proceed as before: consider, the implementation of the symmetric optimum under integration (p ; s ):
Let the manufacturer set the wholesale price to solve (42), the …rst-order condition for service: Using @R i =@s i = p i @q i =@s i ; this implies that w be set at
Substitute w R into the …rst-order condition for price, equation (41); and use
to de…ne the su¢ cient bonus contract written on revenues by the simple di¤erential equation
Finally, set the franchise fee to F R = (p w) q s + I(R ); then, the manufacturer can extract the rents from the downstream level, at the same time serving as a budget breaker for the incentive scheme, and achieve the same pro…ts that would accrue under vertical integration.
For the speci…c functional form assumptions of our model, the su¢ cient bonus incentive scheme takes the form
and the associated wholesale price
Discussion
The failure of incentives schemes based on quantity is intimately related to the failure of simple wholesale pricing contracts. Equation (39) from the proof of part (i) shows that a quantity scheme fails because
or, equivalently
where these terms refer to the retailer and market elasticities of demand with respect to price and service, evaluated at their …rst-best levels. This latter expression is the exact same necessary and su¢ cient condition derived by Winter (1993) for a simple spot market contract to fail. An incentive schemes based solely on quantity are subject to the same bias towards price competition over service provision, in the sense that (39) holds, as are contracts based solely on wholesale price. This result is even more general then it appears. Speci…cally, combine the linear wholesale pricing together with the quantity based incentive scheme to arrive at a contract of the form (q) = wq I(q); i.e. a quantity-based discount wholesale price scheme that explicitly separates the linear part of the contract from the non-linear part. Moreover, Proposition 4(i) implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Quantity forcing is insu¢ cient to coordinate the distribution channel. ; which with some algebraic manipulation can be written as
Proof. With quantity forcing, the constraint on retailer i is q i (p 1 ; p 2 ; s 1 ; s 2 ) > q; where q is the quantity ‡oor. Let denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with this constraint from retailer i 0 s problem under decentralization. Then, the associated …rst order conditions characterizing his equilibrium choice of (p i ; s i ) are
Follow the same development as the proof of Proposition 4(i) to obtain the result.
A bonus scheme based on revenues is (i) minimally su¢ cient to align incentives and (ii) novel to the literature on vertical contractual relations. Equation (44) from the proof of part (ii) makes it the clear that this revenue-based bonus scheme is simple, taking a linear form. Moreover the bonus scheme is easy to implement, as all inputs needed to construct the bonus scheme can be obtained through empirical demand model (see equation (51) below); from a practical viewpoint, this is particularly useful.
The ability for such a bonus contract based on revenues to provide su¢ cient follows from the rate at which it supplements revenues
This condition shows that the contract exploits the spread between the ratio of …rm to market price elasticities and that of service elasticities (the same spread that causes wholesale pricing contracts to fail) to provide the correct incentive needed to make the manufacturer's interests compatible with those of the retail sector.
Intuitively, an incentive scheme based on sales quantity fails because it does not alter the source of incentive incompatibility, namely retail competition. Under a scheme based on sales quantities, the incentive for retailers is to remain engaged in competition over the marginal inter-retailer consumer.
While one retail outlet may wish to increase its sales (and thus its bonus) by going after high-type consumers -providing them with a higher level of service and charging a higher price in return -it knows that by doing so, its rival will undercut price in an attempt to steal low-type consumers.
With symmetric retailers, each o¤ered the same contract, the logic applies to both. Thus, neither retailer disengages from competition with its rival, but rather attempts to achieve higher bonus levels by discounting price.
On the other hand, revenue based incentives can coordinate the distribution channel, as higher bonuses are attainable not only by increasing sales, but also by increasing price. The incentive to increase price, together with the speci…c design of the bonus scheme, dampens competition between the retailers to the point where it is in both their interest to provide higher levels of service to attract high-type consumers.
The manufacturer's role in such a contract is critical. Without someone to act as a Holmstrom (1982) third-party budget breaker for the network of retailers, such a bonus scheme would be infeasible:
it requires incremental resources totaling 2(R) beyond what the vertical supply chain earns through its operations. Through the use of his franchise fee, the manufacturer serves the purpose of providing budget balancedness in the distribution channel, by requiring each retailer to make an extra payment of I(R ) up-front; in equilibrium, the two amounts o¤set.
Proposition 4 characterizes formally establishes that the space of minimally su¢ cient contracts is not monopolized by contracts which rely solely on vertical restraints -there exists substitutes for resale price maintenance: while resale price maintenance may be su¢ cient to coordinate a distribution channel, it is not necessary. It also helps us better understand the reasons as to why sophisticated contracts are needed to coordinate the manufacturer's distribution channel. At …rst glance, it may appear that the driving force behind the call to vertical restraints is a need to limit horizontal competition amongst downstream retailers. The contract suggested here shows us that this is not the case: the failure of spot contracts is driven by a misalignment of incentives between upstream and downstream …rms, particularly over which consumer they should focus their attention on. Vertical restraints are only one way to solve this incentive incompatibility; an equivalent method would be to implement a bonus incentive scheme. Last, it makes clear that the space of solutions to the vertical contracting problem is quite complex: denying incentive schemes based on quantity, but allowing for schemes based on price (resale price maintenance), and on revenue (the product of price and quantity). Additionally, the space of minimally su¢ cient contracts allows for incentives to come through both sticks (RPM), and carrots (bonus schemes). Moreover, given the limited contracting options of the manufacturer, the analysis suggests that when vertical restraints are infeasible, a bonus scheme based on revenues is the unique minimally su¢ cient contract.
Our …ndings also have signi…cant importance for the marketing literature. For, as resale price maintenance is legally uncertain at least, the managers of an upstream …rm may not want to venture into these murky waters. Indeed, what is absent from all models of vertical contractual relations are the implementation costs needed to administer and potentially to provide legal defense for the manufacturer's contracts. In particular, for price restraints, these costs may be high 19 . Thus, the managers of pro…t maximizing upstream …rm wishing to avoid any legal issues raised by price restraints, must look at other forms of contracting to coordinate their distribution channel; this paper characterizes a potential contract for this purpose. Additionally, given the nature of the solution space, not permitting solutions based on quantity alone, but allowing for those based on price or on revenue, the managerial implication is that some upstream …rms may have to reexamine their current incentive schemes.
In particular, quantity based discount schemes may not be providing the level of desired incentives;
instead, a move to bonus schemes based on revenues may be called for.
Revenue Sharing Schemes
As mentioned, a key feature of a incentive scheme based on own revenues is the role of the manufacturer as a third-party budget breaker: by requiring each retailer to make an extra payment up-front through a large franchise fee, the manufacturer can amass enough resources to pay out bonuses after retail competition. However, if retailers are capital constrained at the time of contracting, they will not be able to …nance the required franchise fee. 20 In this case, the proposed …nancial incentive scheme based on a retailer's own revenues will be infeasible. Thus, in the face of retailers who are capital constrained, a manufacturer must restrict his attention to …nancial incentives schemes which are budget balanced at the downstream level, i.e. sharing schemes.
It is clear that pro…t sharing scheme amongst the retailers will be able to coordinate the distribution channel, and achieve budget balancedness at the downstream level. In particular, suppose that each retailer is promised one-half of his competitors pro…ts; in return, he must give one-half of his own pro…ts to his competitor. By construction, the sharing scheme is budget balanced. Moreover, with the addition of marginal cost wholesale pricing, the pro…t sharing scheme is able elicit the …rst-best levels of price and service: the problem of each retailer mirrors that of the vertically integrated manufacturer. 21 While technically able to align the incentives of downstream with upstream, the implementation of a pro…t sharing scheme requires that the operating pro…ts of each retailer are perfectly observable, both to the manufacturer and to retailers. However, with service levels unobservable, manipulation of costs by a retailer can lead to false pro…t signals. Thus, a pro…t sharing scheme may not be feasible for the vertical supply chain.
Of course, the target variables on which the manufacturer to contract on are not limited to pro…ts;
as before, retail revenues are perfectly observable to the manufacturer. In this section, I examine the use revenue sharing schemes to coordinate the supply chain.
Consider the contract (w; F; S(R)); where S( ) is a revenue sharing rule. Under such a contract, the manufacturer collects a share S(R 1 ) of revenues from retailer 1 and redistributes it to his competitor, 
However, it is not obvious that a revenue sharing scheme is able to provide su¢ cient incentives to bring retailer objectives in-line with the manufacturer: while giving a retailer a share of his opponent's revenues may give him incentive to raise his price and quantity, taking away part of his own revenue has the reverse e¤ect. I now show that there indeed exists a sharing scheme that is su¢ cient to coordinate the distribution channel.
Proposition 5
In a decentralized retail network a contract consisting of a wholesale, franchise fee, and revenue sharing scheme is su¢ cient to achieve the …rst-best equilibrium, and achieve downstream 2 1 To see that the pro…t sharing rule is su¢ cient, consider the choice problem of a decentralized retailer. With abuse of notation let r i (w) denote retailer i 0 s operating pro…ts; under this equal sharing rule; …rst order conditions characterizing a retailer's optimal choices are 1 2
Now, with w = 0 it is plain that the above equations are indeed zero at (p 1 ; s 1 ) = (p 2 ; s 2 ) = (p ; s ):
budget balancedness.
Proof. Under the contract fF; w; S(R)g, given his competitors choice (p j ; s j ); retailer i 0 s problem in the retail competition game may be written as
and the associated …rst order conditions characterizing his equilibrium choice of (p i ; s i ) are
Consider the implementation of the symmetric optimum under integration (p ; s ): Note that, at (p ; s ) the two retailers make identical revenues, R i = R j = R : Let the manufacturer set his wholesale price to solve (59), the …rst order condition for service: Using the fact that @R i =@s i = p i @q i =@s i ; and @R j =@s i = p j @q j =@s i ; this implies that w be so that
Hence
Next, substitute w S into the …rst order condition (58) for price, and use the fact that @R i =@p i = (q i + p i @q i =@p i ) and ,@R j =@p i = p j @q j =@p i ; to characterize the su¢ cient revenue sharing scheme through the simple di¤erential equation
Thus, Finally, by charging a …xed franchise fee equal to F = i , the manufacturer can transfer all rents from the downstream level, at the same time serving as a budget breaker for the incentive scheme, and achieve the pro…ts that he would accrue under vertical integration.
Discussion
The fact that a retailer receives a share of his competitor's revenues gives the retailer an incentive to increase his level of price and service. However, taking away part of the retailer's own revenue has the reverse e¤ect -their is a disincentive to in.
Intuitively, by giving each retailer a share of his opponents revenues, retailers internalize the bene…ts from raising their price and service levels on the sales revenue of his opponent from -which arise through the horizontal pecuniary externality. Hence, retail's disengage from price competition, as they put less focusing on the marginal inter-retailer consumer. On the other hand, since a retailer is claimant to less of his own revenues, while still facing the whole cost of service provision, he is less inclined to increase his level of service, and thus increase his price. Thus, the manufacturer must carefully design the revenues sharing scheme to balance disincentives with su¢ cient incentives.
Price Ceilings
In this section, we consider the implication of relaxing Assumption 2 for its alternative. As mentioned before, it is not possible to have an symmetric equilibrium where both segments are covered. As opposed to Assumption 2; we know suppose that the segment of consumers that is fully served under vertical integration is the high-type segment. Thus, for this section, we maintain:
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Assumption 3 In the …rst-best optimum, high-type consumers are fully served
Given the restrictions from Assumption 3, the participation constraint for the low types is binding;
hence there is a low type consumer who is just indi¤erent between purchasing and not, his location given by 2 2 Su¢ cient conditions provided in the appendix.
For high types the market is fully covered. Hence, there exists a consumer in the interior of the city, who is the subject of competition between the two retailers. The location of this consumer is given by
Thus, the demand at retail outlet 1 is given by
Our …rst task is to establish the levels of price and service that the manufacturer seeks to implement in a decentralized equilibrium, i.e. those that he would have set himself had he vertically integrated with his retailers.
Proposition 6
Under vertical integration the price and service levels the manufacturer would set in a symmetric equilibrium are, respectively
Proof. Similar to Proposition 1.
As usual, under vertical integration, the manufacturer focuses on the product margin -which in this case consists of low type consumers. As these consumers are more price sensitive, the manufacturer charges a low price, but o¤ers very little service as a result.
When the retail network of the manufacturer is decentralized, retailers concern themselves with the inter-retailer margin as well. However, in this case, consumers on the inter-retailer margin are those of high-types, who less concerned about price but more interested in sales service. As a result, decentralization results in retailers o¤ering too high level of service and charging too high prices.
Proposition 7 Given a wholesale price w 0; in any symmetric decentralized retail equilibrium where low type consumers are fully served, the common price and service levels set by each retailer are given
Proof. Similar to Proposition 2.
As before, simple spot contracts will fail to coordinate the distribution channel -the usual 1 instrument versus 2 externalities 2 targets story. In this case, retailers are bias towards service competition, and as a result provide too high and charge too high a price, as compared to that which maximizes total supply chain pro…ts. However a price restraint is su¢ cient -this time, a price ceiling.
In this case, a price ceiling mutes the private incentive for retailer's to provide service, as it e¤ectively limits the size of the retail margin.
Proposition 8
In a decentralized retail network: (i) a wholesale price-franchise fee contract fails to coordinate the distribution channel. However, (ii)a contract involving a resale price ‡oor, together with a wholesale price and franchise fee is su¢ cient to achieve the coordinated outcome. 
Unlike our analysis of the model where retailers are bias towards price competition, the discussion of the model with price-ceiling ends here: price ceilings do not raise anti-trust concerns. 23 Thus, since a manufacturer who is faced with retailers that are biased towards service competition can freely appeal to price ceilings, and there is no need (beyond theoretical curiosity) for us to examine alternative contracting options.
Conclusion
While the existing literature on vertical contractual relations has established that resale price maintenance is su¢ cient to coordinate the retail network of a manufacturer, this paper asks whether such vertical restraints are necessary. I study the vertical contracting problem between an upstream manufacturer and his downstream retail distribution in a setting where appealing to resale price maintenance is not possible due to legal prohibition, and examine whether other forms of contracting can achieve the outcome of vertical integration.
I show that a bonus scheme based on retail revenues is su¢ cient to provide enough incentives to decentralized retailers to elicit the correct level of both price and service. Interestingly, an incentive scheme based on retail sales is unable to do so. Intuitively, an incentive scheme based on quantity alone will fail because it does not alter the source of incentive incompatibility, namely retail competition.
In addition, when faced with capital constrained franchisees, a revenue sharing contract is able to achieve the outcome of vertical integration while maintaining downstream budget-balancedness. On the other hand, an incentive scheme based on retail revenue is able to coordinate the distribution channel because higher bonus levels are attainable not only by increasing sales, but also by increasing price; higher service levels then follow, as there is su¢ cient price cost margins to underwrite them.
This paper completes the study of the vertical contracting problem in a Winter (1993) type model.
The extant literature has considered which vertical restraints are su¢ cient to achieve the …rst-best outcome of vertical integration. Here, I characterize the remainder of the solution space by examining which …nancial incentive schemes are minimally su¢ cient.
Of course, this paper does not complete the study vertical restraints. The particular problem modeled here is one between a monopolist manufacturer and a set of independent, oligopolistically competitive retailers who are engaged in both price and non-price competition. What remains for the literature to examine is the su¢ ciency of vertical restrains in model with both upstream and downstream oligopoly. To the best of my knowledge, there is no literature on a vertical supply chains in an environment where both non-price retailer decisions and upstream oligopoly are important 24 . To this end, one possible approach is to take the simpli…ed model I present in Section 3 and extend it to the case where there is duopoly at the upstream level, each manufacturer producing a di¤erentiated variety of the same good. It would be interesting to see whether minimum RPM remains a minimally su¢ cient contract in a model where upstream …rms compete over sales.
Our focus is on a symmetric equilibrium, where p i = p j = p c and s 1 = s 2 = s c . Imposing symmetry on the …rst order conditions yields
Solving this last system of equations gives us the result.
LEMMA 2
Assume R > maxf2 L ;
g: Then, the outcome under vertical integration involves a symmetric price-service o¤ering across retailers. Moreover, under vertical integration low-type consumers are fully served, while a segment of high-type consumers is left uncovered.
Proof: The high-type consumers will be the ones that ares fully served if these consumers get more utility than do the low-types at every address. In particular, this requires R + L ( p s :
